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Cooperative game theory provides valuable tools to examine multi-agent interactive situ-
ations. The classic model of games with transferable utility has been thoroughly studied and
today it is a theory with solid foundations. It has been widely applied to economic, social,
or political problems binding the gap between these fields and mathematics. In particular,
it has endowed social sciences with a formal framework in which meaningful statements can
be done. One of the main research questions is how to distribute the gains obtained by a
given group of agents. In this regard, the Shapley value Shapley (1953) is probably the most
popular solution. It is defined as the average contribution of a player to its predecessors in
a permutation and supported by appealing axiomatic characterizations. Most of the con-
tributions in the literature overlook a key fact in today’s globally interconnected societies,
decisions within a group of agents can affect the outcomes of other groups of agents. Thrall
and Lucas (1963) devised the partition function to incorporate coalitional externalities to
the classic cooperative games.
The generalization of the Shapley value to games with externalities has attracted the
attention of many scholars. Myerson (1977) was the first to tackle this question by using
an axiomatic approach. Some years later, Myerson’s value was criticized for not satisfying
reasonable monotonicity properties and Bolger (1989) proposed another value by adapting
Shapley’s original axioms in a different way. Lately, several families of values that generalize
the Shapley value to games with externalities have been introduced. Macho-Stadler et al.
(2007) used an average approach to build their family, which also contains the value proposed
by Albizuri et al. (2005). Dutta et al. (2010) followed the potential approach to define
another family that contains the previous one. In Skibski et al. (2018) an even wider family
of values is proposed and characterized. All these generalizations are efficient, symmetric,
and linear values. Sánchez-Pérez (2015) characterized this wider family of values. Finally, we
would like to mention two remarkable generalizations of the Shapley value introduced by de
Clippel and Serrano (2008) and McQuillin (2009). Even if the approach and characterization
results in the two papers are completely independent, the resulting values are in some sense
complementary to each other, and they serve us for illustration purposes.
The reason for having so many different generalizations of the Shapley value is the non
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trivial task of generalizing the concept of the contribution of a player to a coalition. Indeed,
when a player leaves a coalition it could either remain alone or join another coalition in
the structure. The contribution of a player to a coalition is also the main ingredient of
the null player concept. Therefore, from an axiomatic perspective, the way to generalize
the null player property is an important difference between the values that can be found
in the literature. On the one hand, a weak null player does not affect the worth of any
coalition when he leaves it to remain alone. On the other hand, a strong null player does not
affect the worth of any coalition by leaving it to either stand alone or join another existing
coalition. The properties that correspond to these two notions of null player have been used
in the characterization results of Bolger (1989); Macho-Stadler et al. (2007); de Clippel and
Serrano (2008); McQuillin (2009), and Skibski et al. (2018), among others. Note that, the null
player property is not the only distinguishing property of the existing characterization results
which also involve different versions of symmetry, marginality, and consistency properties,
for instance.
Here we introduce a new family of values, the so-called lattice structure values (LS-
values), following a different approach to define what the contribution of a player is in a
game with externalities. In the classic case, a contribution is based on the movement of
a player that joins a coalition and corresponds to a link in the Boolean lattice of subsets.
In games with externalities the focus is on embedded coalitions which consist of a coalition
and a partition of the complementary coalition. In Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) we saw that
the set of embedded coalitions, ECN , has a (no Boolean) lattice structure when endowed
with the partial order v, defined therein.1 Then, we consider that each link in this lattice
generates a contribution that could be used to compute a value. However, in this case more
than one player could be involved in the change of the embedded coalition. Basically, it
could be that a player moves from being alone to joining the active coalition or it could also
be that an inactive coalition splits into two new ones. The family of values is parametrized
by certain weights that are used to distribute the contributions in which several players are
involved. We show that the family of values studied in Skibski et al. (2018) are instances of
1Grabisch (2010) was the first to study a partial order over ECN . Using that partial order Grabisch and
Funaki (2012) defined several families of values that are not related to ours.
4
LS-values which are in turn contained in the class of values studied by Sánchez-Pérez (2015).
We deliver an axiomatic characterization of the family of LS-values by means of efficiency,
symmetry, linearity, and a new version of the null player property which is weaker than the
two ones described above. Taking into account the way in which we define contributions,
we consider that a player is null only if he is never involved in a movement that creates a
non-null contribution. We show that if a game with externalities has a player of this type,
then the game is actually a classic cooperative game. The basis of the set of games with
externalities proposed by de Clippel and Serrano (2008) and the coefficients of any game
in this basis –equivalent ot the classic Harsanyi dividends– obtained in Alonso-Meijide et
al. (2017) play a relevant role in our results and their exposition. Finally, we single out a
particular LS-value, the so-called covering value, that is new in the literature and gives rise
to balanced payoffs in unanimity games. We also provide a specific characterization of the
covering value by means of two proportionality properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and
previous results that we will build upon. Section 3 presents the new family of values and
relate it to other remarkable values in the literature. Section 4 is devoted to the axiomati-
zation of the family of values. Before that we explain what are contributions in this setting
and introduce the new null player property. The covering value and its characterization is
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Cooperative games
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v) where N is a finite set and
v : 2N → R is a function with v (∅) = 0. The elements of N = {1, 2, . . . , n} are called
players, the subsets S ⊆ N coalitions, v is the characteristic function, and v (S) is the worth
of S in the game. For a given N we denote by GN the family of these games with set of
players N . We may omit the reference to the set of players and only write it explicitly in
case it is different from N . Player i ∈ N is a null player in v ∈ GN if v (S) = v (S \ {i}) for
all S ⊆ N with i ∈ S. The unanimity game of coalition T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, is denoted by uT
and defined for every S ⊆ N by uT (S) = 1, if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0, otherwise. Unanimity
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games constitute a basis of the vector space GN . Indeed, every game v can be written as a









(−1)|T |−|S| v (S) . (1)
The coefficients of the above combination, ∆vT , for all non-empty coalition T ⊆ N , are called
Harsanyi dividends Harsanyi (1963) of the game. They satisfy
∑
S⊆T
∆vS = v(T ). (2)
A value on GN assigns to each game v ∈ GN a payoff vector in RN , where each component
represents the payment to a player according to his cooperation possibilities. The Shapley




γS[v(S)− v(S \ {i})],
where γS =
(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!





, if i ∈ T
0, otherwise.
(3)
This value is the only one satisfying the axioms below. Let ΘN be the set of permutations
of N . If θ ∈ ΘN then for each v ∈ GN we define the game θv by θv(S) = v(θ−1S) for every
S ⊆ N . Let f be a value on GN .
(S1) Linearity. For every a, b ∈ R and v, w ∈ GN , f(av + bw) = af(v) + bf(w).
(S2) Efficiency. For every v ∈ GN ,
∑
i∈N fi(v) = v(N).
(S3) Symmetry. For every v ∈ GN , i ∈ N , and θ ∈ ΘN , fθ(i)(θv) = fi(v).
(S4) Null player axiom. If i ∈ N is a null player in v ∈ GN , then fi(v) = 0.
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2.2. Partitions and embedded coalitions
Let ΠN denote the set of partitions of a finite set N .
2 Let P,Q ∈ ΠN , we say that P is
finer than Q and write P  Q if for all S ∈ P there is T ∈ Q such that S ⊆ T . We write
P ≺ Q when P  Q but P 6= Q. (ΠN ,) is a lattice. If P  Q, then
[P,Q] = {M ∈ ΠN : P M  Q}.
The top of this poset is dNe = {N} and the bottom bNc = {{i} : i ∈ N}. If P  Q and








where mq is the number of subsets in which Sq is divided in P .
If P ∈ ΠN and Q ⊆ P then P−Q = P \ Q ∈ ΠN\⋃T∈Q T . If P ∈ ΠN\T and Q ∈ ΠT then
P+Q = P ∪Q ∈ ΠN .
An embedded coalition is a pair (S;P ) where S ⊆ N and P ∈ ΠN\S, namely a coalition
and a partition of the complementary coalition (we call groups to the subsets in P ). We
denote by ECN the set of all embedded coalitions of a finite set N . (S;P ) ∈ ECN with
S = ∅ and P ∈ ΠN is called empty embedded coalition. ECN0 denotes the set of all non-empty
embedded coalitions of a finite set N .
2.3. Games with externalities
A game with externalities is a pair (N, v) consisting of a finite set of players N and a
partition function v : ECN → R, satisfying v(∅;P ) = 0. Again, we may omit the reference
to the player set and only write it explicitly when it is different from N . The amount
v(S;P ) should be understood as the utility or worth that coalition S obtains when the
group structure P Aumann and Dreze (1974) emerges in N \ S. From now on, we name
classic games those games defined in Subsection 2.1. We denote by GN the set of games with
externalities with player set N . GN is a vector space with the sum and scalar product of
functions. For every (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 , the unanimity game of (the embedded coalition) (T ;Q)
2By an abuse of notation, we use ∅ to denote the only partition in Π∅.
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is defined by3
u(T ;Q)(S;P ) =
1, if T ⊆ S and P+bS\T c  Q0, otherwise, (4)
for all (S;P ) ∈ ECN . It is easy to notice that u(S;P ) is a game with negative externalities
Hafalir (2007) as other coalitions becoming larger may cause a decrease in the worth of a
coalition. Note that the name of the above games is chosen deliberately for the parallelism
that exists between them and the basis of classic cooperative games. Indeed, for every T ⊆ N ,
T 6= ∅ and every (S;P ) ∈ ECN , uT (S) = u(T ;dN\T e)(S;P ). The set
{
u(T ;Q) : (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0
}
is a basis of the vector space GN de Clippel and Serrano (2008).
A value on GN is a mapping f : GN → RN . There are several values in the literature
that extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (see for instance, Myerson, 1977;
Bolger, 1989; Macho-Stadler et al., 2007; de Clippel and Serrano, 2008; McQuillin, 2009;
Skibski et al., 2018). All of them satisfy the logical extension of the first three axioms (S1),
(S2), and (S3) that we describe below. If θ ∈ ΘN , then for each v ∈ GN we define the game
θv as θv(S;P ) = v(θ−1S; θ−1P ) for any (S;P ) ∈ ECN , where θP = {θT : T ∈ P}. Let f be
a value on GN .
(SE1) Linearity. For every a, b ∈ R and v, w ∈ GN , f(av + bw) = af(v) + bf(w).
(SE2) Efficiency. For every v ∈ GN ,
∑
i∈N fi(v) = v(N ; ∅).
(SE3) Symmetry. For every v ∈ GN , i ∈ N , and θ ∈ ΘN , fθ(i)(θv) = fi(v).
Sánchez-Pérez (2015) analyzed and characterized all the values on GN that satisfy the
above axioms. However, the notion of a null player has been extended in several ways and
there are different corresponding properties (see for instance, Dutta et al., 2010). We present
them explicitly and elaborate on this point in Section 4.
3. The family of LS-values
From the definition of a unanimity game with externalities we can infer a binary relation,
v, among embedded coalitions. Let (S;P ), (T ;Q) ∈ ECN , we say that (T ;Q) is contained in
(S;P ) and write (T ;Q) v (S;P ) if and only if u(T ;Q)(S;P ) = 1. We write (T ;Q) < (S;P )
3The definition of unanimity games also works for any empty embedded coalition, however we omit them
because they play no role in our analysis.
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is thoroughly studied4. Figure 1 depicts the Hasse diagram of this
poset of embedded coalitions for three players. In that paper, the coefficients of any game
(N ; ∅)
({1, 2}; {3}) ({1, 3}; {2}) ({2, 3}; {1})
({1}; {{2}, {3}}) ({2}; {{1}, {3}}) ({3}; {{1}, {2}})
({1}; {2, 3}) ({2}; {1, 3}) ({3}; {1, 2})
(∅; {1, 2, 3})
(∅; {{1}, {2, 3}}) (∅; {{2}, {1, 3}}) (∅; {{3}, {1, 2}})
(∅; {{1}, {2}, {3}})




with N = {1, 2, 3}.
in the basis of unanimity games are obtained explicitly. Below, we adjust Proposition 12
in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) to the structure with all the embedded coalitions (also the
empty ones).

















Following Harsanyi (1963), we call dividends to the coefficients δv(T ;Q) in the above propo-
sition. These coefficients can also be obtained from a recursive procedure, as it is the case
for the dividends of a classic game.
4In that paper all the empty embedded coalitions are taken as only one in the structure.
9
Lemma 2. Let v ∈ GN be a game with externalities. If (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 then










µ ((S;P ), (T ;Q)) v(S;P ),
where µ is the Möbius function of the poset (ECN ,v). Hence, the Möbius inversion formula












Assuming linearity as a desirable condition for a value we can introduce a new family
of values taking into account Proposition 1. We only need to define the outcome for the
unanimity games defined in Equation (4). Let N be a finite set with |N | = n.
Definition 1. A number with externalities for n is a tuple,
(





1. t, r1, . . . , rp, λ1, . . . , λp ∈ N,
2. r1 < · · · < rp,
3. t+
∑p
k=1 λkrk = n.
The interior of the number is t, the externalities are r1, . . . , rp and their multiplicities are
λ1, . . . , λp. Besides, (n; 0) is considered a number with externalities (actually the number
without externalities). The set of numbers with externalities for n is denoted by En.
In a number with externalities we do not write the multiplicity if it is one. For instance,
if n = 4 then










So, we can define the cardinality of a non-empty embedded coalition using a number with
externalities.




|T |; rλ11 , . . . , rλpp
)
∈ En
where Q consists of λk groups of cardinality rk for all k = 1, . . . , p. In particular, |N ; ∅| = (n; 0).
The next definition introduces coefficients to allocate the worth in a unanimity game.
Definition 3. A unanimity function over En is a vectorial mapping α satisfying for all
(t; rλ1 , . . . , r
λp





















The set of unanimity functions is denoted by FN .
We give now our family of values inspired by Proposition 1 and Equation (3). For any
u(T ;Q) with (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 , a family of unanimity coefficients determines the influence of each
group depending on the position in (T ;Q). Observe that coalition T needs that N \ T sorts
out in Q to get the profit. So, α0(|T ;Q|) can be understood as an importance index about
the formation of coalition T and αr(|T ;Q|) an importance index about the formation of each
group R ∈ Q with |R| = r for separating and forming Q. Assuming that cooperation is
desirable and that coalitions compete for a limited resource, the worst situation for T is the
alliance of all the players in N \ T , thus it is sensible to assume that α1(|T ; dN \ T e|) = 0.
The third is a normalization condition.
Let α ∈ FN and (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 with |T ;Q| = (t; r
λ1
1 , . . . , r
λp
p ). If i ∈ T , we take k(i) = 0
and |T ;Q|i = t. For each i ∈ R ∈ Q, we take k(i) ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that |R| = rk(i) and
|T ;Q|i = λk(i)rk(i).
Definition 4. Let α ∈ FN . The lattice structure value associated with α, LSα, is defined as










for all (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 and i ∈ N . The family of LS-values is the set {LSα : α ∈ FN}.






These solutions can be seen as the application of the Shapley value to a particular classic
cooperative game. The next proposition helps to understand better the meaning of the
unanimity functions. The proof follows from Equation (3) and the linearity of the Shapley
value.
Proposition 3. Let α ∈ FN be a unanimity function. The LS-value associated with α
satisfies for each (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 with |T ;Q| = (t; r
λ1








 T, if k = 0⋃
{R∈Q:|R|=rk}R, if k 6= 0.
A game v ∈ GN is said to be without externalities if v(S;P ) = v(S;Q) for all (S;P ), (S;Q) ∈
ECN . Each game without externalities v is associated with a classic game wv ∈ GN in the
following way, for all S ⊆ N
wv(S) = v(S; dN \ Se). (6)
Note that we can consider that classic games are contained in the set of games with exter-
nalities. Next proposition states that any LS-value coincides with the Shapley value when
the game is without externalities.
Proposition 4. Let v ∈ GN be a game without externalities. Then, LSα(v) = φ(wv), for all
α ∈ FN .




T , if Q = dN \ T e
0, otherwise.
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We proceed by a double induction: in the cardinality of T and in the cardinality of Q. First,
we take the base case defined by |T | = 1 and |Q| = 1. If T = {i},
δv({i};dN\{i}e) = v({i}; dN \ {i}e) = wv({i}) = ∆w
v
{i}.
Now, let us take Q ∈ Π(N \ T ) with |Q| = 2. Let us assume Q = {T1, T2}. We get
δv({i};{T1,T2}) = v({i}; {T1, T2})− v({i}; dT1 ∪ T2e) = 0.
Suppose the claim is true for all ({i};Q) with 1 < |Q| < m < n− 1. We prove the equality




δv({i};P ) = v({i};Q)− v({i}; dN \ {i}e) = 0.
Now suppose the claim is true for all (T ;Q) with 1 ≤ |T | < t ≤ n and all Q ∈ Π(N \ T ) .
We prove the equality when |T | = t and |Q| = 1. By Lemma 2, the induction hypothesis,
and Equation (2)












Suppose the claim is true for all (T ;Q) with |T | = t and 1 < |Q| < m < n − 1. Consider
(T ;Q) with |Q| = m. Again by Lemma 2, the induction hypothesis, and Equation (2),
δv(T ;Q) = v(T ;Q)−
∑
(S;P )<(T ;Q):P 6=Q






S = 0. (8)
Thus, we prove the claim.
Second, it remains to show LSα(v) = φ(v). From Proposition 3 and the concept of a

















T φ(uT ) = φ(w
v),
and that concludes the proof.
Next, we show that some of the known values in the literature are instances of LS-values
and we also introduce a new one.
Example 1. The externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008), f cs, is a value on
GN defined as the Shapley value of the classic game v∗, given by v∗(S) = v(S; bN \Sc). That
is, for every v ∈ GN , f cs(v) = φ(v∗). Obviously this value implies a big loss of information.
It is clear that u∗(T ;Q) = uT for all (T ;Q) ∈ EC
N
0 because
(T ;Q) v (S; bN \ Sc) if and only if T ⊆ S.
So, f cs(u(T ;Q)) = φ(uT ) and then f
cs = LSα with
α(t; rλ11 , . . . , r
λp
p ) = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∀(t; r
λ1
1 , . . . , r
λp
p ) ∈ En.
Example 2. McQuillin (2009) defined a value on GN that can be considered the counterpart
of the externality-free value. If de Clippel and Serrano (2008) used the top in the structure
(ECN ,v) to define the associated classic game McQuillin (2009) used the bottom. That is,
for every v ∈ GN , f q(v) = φ(v∗∗), where v∗∗ ∈ GN is defined by v∗∗(S) = v(S; dN \ Se) for
all S ⊆ N .




uN\R − (|Q| − 1)uN . (9)
If S ( N then (T ;Q) v (S; dN \ Se) if and only if there exists R0 ∈ Q with N \ S ⊆ R0
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(namely, N \R0 ⊆ S). Moreover, as Q is a partition, R0 is unique. We obtain




It follows immediately that if (T ;Q) 6v (S; dN \ Se) then
u∗∗(T ;Q)(S) = 0.
If S = N , clearly (T ;Q) v (N ; ∅) and N \R ⊆ N for any R ∈ Q. Thus,
u∗∗(T ;Q)(N) = 1 =
∑
R∈Q
uN\R(N)− (|Q| − 1)uN(N).
In particular, if |Q| = 1, then u∗∗(T ;Q) = uT .
Second, we check that f q is also a LSα value. If i ∈ T then i ∈ N \ R for any R and
if i ∈ R0 ∈ Q then i ∈ N \ R for all R ∈ Q \ R0. Using the linearity of the Shapley value,











− |Q| − 1
n





− |Q| − 1
n
, if i ∈ R0 ∈ Q.
Observe that if |T ;Q| = (t; rλ1 , . . . , r
λp
p ) then |Q| =
∑p
k=1 λk. Now we take the following
unanimity function. If (t; rλ1 , . . . , r
λp
p ) ∈ En with p > 1,
α0
(
















and if k0 ∈ {1, . . . , p}
αk0
(



















Also α(t;n − t) = (1, 0). Obviously, we have f q = LSα. In order to prove that α is a
unanimity function, we only need to see the third condition in the definition. Suppose
(t; rλ1 , . . . , r
λp





1 , . . . , r
λp














































































Example 3. The modified egalitarian solution is a value on GN defined by taking






(t, λ1r1, . . . , λprp), if p > 1
(1, 0), if p = 1
for all (t; rλ11 , . . . , r
λp
p ) ∈ En. Obviously, it is easy to check that α is a unanimity function.
Following Definition 4, the LS-value associated to this unanimity function is given by the
linear extension of




, if |Q| > 1
1
t
, if |Q| = 1, i ∈ T
0, if |Q| = 1, i /∈ T
for every (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 . Fixed the unanimity game of an embedded coalition (T ;Q). On
one hand, fme assigns the same amount for all the players, into or out the coalition T when
|Q| > 1, and on the other hand, fme only gives the same non-null amount to players in T
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when |Q| = 1.
4. Axiomatization of the family of LS-values
We introduce a new concept of contribution for a player in a game with externalities. In
the classic theory a contribution can be identified with a link in the Boolean algebra 2N .
Our approach uses the lattice structure (see Figure 1) of the set of embedded coalitions,
(ECN ,v). The links in this lattice can be considered an indivisible step in the formation of
an embedded coalition and its associated worth. Links can be of two types: a player joins
a coalition or a group is divided in two. Accordingly, there are two types of contributions.
Each link represents a cover relation in the partial order. Let (S;P ), (T ;Q) ∈ ECN be two
embedded coalitions, (T ;Q) covers (S;P ) in (ECN ,v) if one of these facts happens,
a) there exists i ∈ T with S = T \ {i} and P = Q+b{i}c, or
b) S = T and there are two different groups T1, T2 ∈ Q with P = Q−{T1,T2}+dT1∪T2e
Definition 5. Let v ∈ GN be a game. The contribution when (T ;Q) covers (S;P ) in v is
defined by
v(T ;Q)− v(S;P ).
In the classic theory, the contribution is marginal for a player because each link represents
a player joining a coalition. Now, there can be several players involved in a contribution.
We consider a player active in a link if his affiliation changes between its two endpoints.
Definition 6. Let (S;P ), (T ;Q) ∈ ECN be two embedded coalitions such that (T ;Q) covers
(S;P ). A player i ∈ N is active in the link, and it is denoted by (S;P ) Ci (T ;Q), if
S = T \ {i} or P = Q−{T1,T2}+dT1∪T2e with i ∈ T1 ∪ T2.
The contributions of the first type, are called marginal because each of them is attributed
to only one player. They are parallel to the marginal contributions in classic games. But
now we also have contributions of a second type that we call external. The concept of null
player is strongly connected to the idea of a contribution. Two of the most used definitions
of null player are the following (see de Clippel and Serrano, 2008; Macho-Stadler et al.,
2007). A player i is a weak null player in v ∈ GN if for all (S;P ) ∈ ECN with i ∈ S it
17
holds v(S \ {i};P+d{i}e) = v(S;P ). A player i is a strong null player in v ∈ GN if for all
(S;P ) ∈ ECN with i ∈ S and T ∈ P ∪ {∅} it holds v(S \ {i};P−dT e+dT∪{i}e) = v(S;P ).
Obviously any strong null player is also a weak null player. Both concepts do not take into
account the external contributions. Now we introduce a new notion of null player using both
types of contributions.
Definition 7. Let v ∈ GN be a game with externalities. A player i ∈ N is a complete null
player in v if v(S;P ) = v(T ;Q) for every (S;P ), (T ;Q) ∈ ECN with (T ;Q) covers (S;P )
and (S;P ) Ci (T ;Q).
A complete null player has all his contributions null, namely in all the embedded coalitions
the contributions with this player active are null. All the complete null players are also
strong null players but not vice-versa. The next example shows a game with externalities
that illustrates the previous concepts and has a strong null player who is not a complete null
player.
Example 4. Consider the game with externalities over N = {1, 2, 3, 4} given by
v(4; {{1}, {2}, {3}}) = v(4; {{1}, {2, 3}}) = v(4; {{2}, {1, 3}}) = v({3, 4}; {{1}, {2}}) = 1,
and v(S;P ) = 0 otherwise. The embedded coalition ({3, 4}; {{1}, {2}}) covers ({4}; {{1}, {2}, {3}}).
In this case player 3 is the unique active player in the link. Besides, it gives rise a marginal
contribution equal to
v({3, 4}; {{1}, {2}})− v(4; {{1}, {2}, {3}}) = 1− 1 = 0.
The embedded coalition ({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}}) covers ({4}; {{1, 2, 3}. Now, players 1, 2, and 3
are the active players in the link. In this case, the associated external contribution is
v({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}})− v({4}; {1, 2, 3}) = 1− 0 = 1.
We check that player 3 is a strong null player. Let (S;P ) ∈ ECN with 3 ∈ S. It holds that if
(S;P ) 6= ({3, 4}; {{1}, {2}}), then v(S;P ) = v(S \ {3};Q) = 0 where Q is any partition of
the form Q = P−dT e+dT∪{3}e for any T ∈ P or Q = P+b{3}c. If (S;P ) = ({3, 4}; {{1}, {2}}),
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then
v(S;P ) = v({4}; {{1}, {2}, {3}}) = v({4}; {{1, 3}, {2}}) = v({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}}) = 1.
Thus, we prove that player 3 is a strong null player. But player 3 is not a complete null
player because
v({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}}) = 1 and v({4}; {1, 2, 3}) = 0.
Recall that a game without externalities is a game v ∈ GN satisfying v(S;P ) = v(S;Q) for
all (S;P ), (S;Q) ∈ ECN and that it can be considered equivalent to a classic one. Indeed, if
v ∈ GN is a game without externalities then the classic game associated to it (see Equation 6)
is defined by wv(S) = v(S;P ) for any P ∈ ΠN\S. Next, we prove that if there is a complete
null player in a game with externalities then the game is equivalent to a classic game.
Proposition 5. Let v ∈ GN . If there exists a complete null player in v, then v is a game
without externalities. Moreover, this player is a null player in wv ∈ GN .
Proof. Consider that i ∈ N is a complete null player in the game v ∈ GN . Let (S;P ) ∈ ECN
be an embedded coalition. We show that v(S;P ) = v(S; dN \ Se) .
Suppose first that i /∈ S. We proceed by induction on |P |. Obviously the result is true
when |P | = 1. If |P | = 2 then the result follows from the concept of complete null player
because if P = {T1, T2}, (S; {T1, T2}) covers (S; dT1∪T2e), i ∈ T1∪T2, and (S; {T1∪T2}) Ci
(S; {T1, T2}). Now, assuming that the result is true when |P | = k−1 we prove it for |P | = k.
Let T1, T2 ∈ P with i ∈ T1 ∪ T2. Then,
v(S;P ) = v(S;P−{T1,T2}+dT1∪T2e) = v(S; dN \ Se),
where the first equality follows from the definition of complete null player and the second
one by the induction hypothesis. Then, v(S;P ) = v(S; dN \ Se) .
Secondly, suppose that i ∈ S. The definition of complete null player and the above result
imply
v(S;P ) = v(S\{i};P+b{i}c) = v(S\{i}; dN\S∪{i}e) = v(S\{i}; {N\S, {i}}) = v(S; dN\Se).
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Finally, we show that player i is a null player in wv. Let S ⊆ N with i ∈ S andP ∈ ΠN\S.
Then,
wv(S) = v(S;P ) = v(S \ {i};P+b{i}c) = wv(S \ {i}),
that is, player i is null player in wv and we conclude the proof.
Sánchez-Pérez (2015) introduced and characterized a family of values by means of lin-
earity (SE1), efficiency (SE2), and symmetry (SE3). We provide the family of LS-values
with an axiomatization using the same axioms (SE1, SE2, and SE3) and a new null player
property. Before, we present two existing null player axioms (see for instance de Clippel and
Serrano, 2008; Macho-Stadler et al., 2007). Let f be a value on GN .
(SE4a) Weak null player property. If i ∈ N is a weak null player in v then fi(v) = 0.
(SE4b) Strong null player property. If i ∈ N is a strong null player in v then fi(v) = 0.
The externality-free value de Clippel and Serrano (2008) is the only value on GN satis-
fying (SE1), (SE2), (SE3), and (SE4a). Skibski et al. (2018) described the family of values
for games with externalities satisfying (SE1), (SE2), (SE3), and (SE4b). Moreover, they
described a particular weaker null player property in order to identify each element of the
family. Next we introduce a new property based on the new concept of null player.
(SE4c) Complete null player property. If i ∈ N is a complete null player in v then fi(v) = 0.
Clearly, (SE4a) implies (SE4b) and (SE4b) implies (SE4c). Next, we show that every
LS-value satisfies the axioms.
Theorem 6. All LS-values satisfy linearity (SE1), efficiency (SE2), symmetry (SE3), and
the complete null player property (SE4c).
Proof. Consider the LSα-value with α ∈ FN . We check that it satisfies each axiom.
Linearity. It follows directly from Definition 4.
Efficiency. Taken a game v ∈ GN , Lemma 2 implies
































Taking into account the definition of a unanimity function, we obtain for each (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0
with |T ;Q| = (t; rλ11 , · · · , r
λp































1 , · · · , rλpp ) = 1.
Symmetry. Consider θ ∈ ΘN and (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 . Note that θu(T ;Q) = u(θT ;θQ). In fact,
θu(T ;Q)(S;P ) = u(T ;Q)(θ
−1S; θ−1P ) and then θu(T ;Q)(S;P ) = 1 if (T ;Q) v (θ−1S; θ−1P ),
namely (θT ; θQ) v (S;P ), and θu(T ;Q)(S;P ) = 0 otherwise. But |T ;Q| = |θT ; θQ| and so
we obtain LSαθi(θu(T ;Q)) = LS
α
i (v) for all i ∈ N . If v ∈ GN then for each (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 we
have δθv(θT ;θQ) = δ
v
(T ;Q). The equality is true when we take an embedded coalition of the form
({i}; dN \ {i}e) with i ∈ N because
δθv({θi};dN\{θi}e) = θv({θi}; dN \ {θi}e) = v({i}; dN \ {i}e) = δv({i};dN\{i}e).
From Lemma 2 we get the equality by induction for all the embedded coalitions. So, by the











i (u(T ;Q)) = LS
α
i (v).
Complete null player property. Suppose there exists a complete null player i ∈ N in
v ∈ GN . Proposition 5 implies that v is a game without externalities and that player i is a
null player in wv. As the Shapley value satisfies the null player property, then Proposition 4
establishes that LSαi (v) = φi(w
v) = 0.
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The next theorem shows that the only values satisfying these axioms are LS-values.
Theorem 7. If a value on GN satisfies linearity (SE1), efficiency (SE2), symmetry (SE3),
and complete null player property (SE4c), then it is a LS-value.
Proof. Let f be a value on GN satisfying the axioms. By linearity we only need to find a











∈ En and (T ;Q) ∈ ECN with |T ;Q| =
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every k = 1, . . . , p
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being i ∈ T ′ ∈ Q with |T ′| = rk. Besides, we consider
α0
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with i ∈ T and |T | = t. Symmetry of f guarantees that α is well defined, because the payoff
is the same for all the players in groups with the same size for all the embedded coalitions of
a given cardinality. Obviously, the function α satisfies the required equality, thus we focus
on checking that α is a unanimity function. By definition α
(




∈ Rp+1 for all(




∈ En. Let (t;n− t) with t > 0. We have
α1(t;n− t) = (n− t)fi(u(T ;dN\T e)),
with |T | = t and i /∈ T . Since i is a complete null player in u(T ;dN\T e) and f satisfies the
complete null player property, we obtain α1(t;n − t) = 0. Now fixed (t; rλ11 , . . . , r
λp
p ) ∈ En.
Let (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 with |T ;Q| =
(



















fi(u(T ;Q)) = u(T ;Q)(N ; ∅) = 1.
Thus, we finish the proof.
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Notice that Equation (10) provides a method to obtain the unanimity function associated
to a LS-value.
Sánchez-Pérez (2015) described the family of all values on GN that satisfy (SE1), (SE2),
and (SE3). Thus, the LS-values are instances of that family, but not all the values satisfying






for all i ∈ N and v ∈ GN . Since (SE4b) implies (SE4c), then all the values on GN studied by
Skibski et al. (2018) are LS-values. But there exist LS-values which do not belong to that
family as we see in the next Section.
5. The covering value
In this section we introduce a particular LS-value. Each value in our family is determined
by the definition of payoffs for unanimity games, which are in turn specified by unanimity
functions. Next, we will describe a way to share the unit of worth in the unanimity game
of the embedded coalition (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 . We follow an interpretation of the formula of the
Shapley value for the classic unanimity games (Equation (3)). Consider a classic unanimity
game uT for a non-empty coalition T ⊆ N . The Shapley value shares the unit of worth
equally among the contributions to this coalition. We have |T | contributions, in each of
them the contribution is marginal for a different player of T . Hence, the payoff to a player is
the probability of being an active player in a contribution. We extend this idea to unanimity
games with externalities, taking into account our considerations on what a contribution for a
player is. First, we calculate the number of contributions to a particular embedded coalition.
Proposition 8. Let (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 . The number of embedded coalitions covered by (T ;Q) is
cov(T ;Q) = |T |+ |Q|(|Q| − 1)
2
.
Proof. There is one for each player in coalition T of the form (T \{i};Q+b{i}c). Furthermore,






According to Proposition 8, if we take (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 with |Q| = 1, then cov(T ;Q) = |T |.
We understand an embedded coalition (T ;Q) as a coalition T which obtains certain payoff
depending on the structure of groups formed in the external side of the coalition, in N \ T .
Now we take any embedded coalition (S;P ) covered by (T ;Q). If (S;P ) produces a marginal
contribution, namely S = T \ {i} for certain i ∈ T , then we consider the contribution only
as a payoff for this player i. If (S;P ) generates an external contribution, namely S = T ,
then we consider the contribution as a payoff not only to the active players in the link, all of
them out of T , but also to the players in the coalition T . We include players in coalition T
because they form the coalition that generates the worth. So, we assign to each player in T
a marginal contribution and a part of each external contribution, and we assign to a player
not in T a part of those external contributions in which he is active in the link.

















, if i /∈ T
for every (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 , where U(Q) = {S ∪ S ′ : S, S ′ ∈ Q,S 6= S ′}.
Next we show that the covering value is an instance of the family of LS-values.
Proposition 9. The covering value is a LS-value.
Proof. Let
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∈ En. We define
cov
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and for all k = 1, . . . , p
αk
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t+ rk + rm
 . (13)
We have to prove that the covering value can be obtained applying Equation (10) through
function α and that α is a unanimity function. First, let (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 with |T ;Q| =(



















t+ rk + rm
]
(14)
by reordering the elements in U(Q) according to the size of the groups in Q. Let i 6∈ T .














t+ rk + rm
(15)




, ∀k = 0, . . . , p.
It remains to show that α is a unanimity function. By definition α
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(λ1 + · · ·+ λp)2 − (λ1 + · · ·+ λp)
2
= cov(t; rλ11 , . . . , r
λp
p ),
which completes the proof.
The covering value is an example of LS-value which does not satisfy strong null player
property. We show this fact in the next example.
Example 5. Let us take up again the game with externalities defined in Example 4. Recall
that player 3 is a strong null player in v but he is not a complete null player. We determine
player 3’s payoff given by the covering value. The game v, following Proposition 1, can be
written as
v = u({4};{1},{2,3}) + u({4};{2},{1,3}) − u({4};{1},{2},{3}) − u({1,4};{2,3}) − u({2,4};{1,3}) + u({1,2,4};{3}).














6= 0, the covering value does not satisfy the strong null player property. The
















We compute the payoff vectors given by f cs and f q, defined in Example 1 and Example 2,
respectively. Notice that
v∗ = u{4} − u{1,4} − u{2,4} + u{1,2,4} and v∗∗ = 0.
Thus,










and f q(v) = φ(v∗∗) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
Proposition 9 guarantees that the covering value satisfies linearity (SE1), efficiency (SE2),
symmetry (SE3), and complete null player (SE4c). We propose now properties that pin down
the covering value. We follow the idea of hierarchical power of Faigle and Kern (1992) in
the sense that we propose certain proportionality between the payoffs in a unanimity game
and the measure of power for an embedded coalition. Let (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 be an embedded
coalition. The power in this embedded coalition is measured by two levels: the activity level
of coalition T with respect to Q





























(T ;Q) and act(T ;Q) + spl(T ;Q) = cov(T ;Q).
In the following we propose two new properties based on these measures in order to charac-
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terize the covering value. Let f be a value on GN .






















To conclude this Section, we characterize the covering value in the next result.
Theorem 10. The covering value κ is the only value on GN satisfying linearity (SE1),
efficiency (SE2), symmetry (SE3), proportionality on activity versus spliting (SE5), and the
partial splitting property (SE6).
Proof. Existence. In Theorem 6, we proved that all LS-values satisfy (SE1), (SE2) and
(SE3). It is easy to check that the covering value κ satisfies (SE5) and (SE6).
Uniqueness. Let f be a value on GN satisfying all the axioms in the statement. By (SE1)
we only need to show uniqueness for unanimity games. Let (T ;Q) ∈ ECN0 . Since f satisfies

















act(T ;Q) + spl(T ;Q)
.
Using (SE3), we get fi(u(T ;Q)) = fj(u(T ;Q)) for all i, j ∈ T . Then, for each i ∈ T we have
fi(u(T ;Q)) =
act(T ;Q)
|T | (act(T ;Q) + spl(T ;Q))
.
Applying again (SE3), fi(u(T ;Q)) = fj(u(T ;Q)), for all i, j ∈ S with S ∈ Q. Let i /∈ T . If
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|Q| = 1, namely Q = dN \ T e, then (SE5) and (SE3) imply
act(T ;Q)|N \ T |fi(u(T ;Q)) = 0, (18)
because the splitting level is spl(T ;Q) = 0. Thus, fi(u(T ;Q)) = 0. Suppose now that |Q| > 1.













Using (SE2), we obtain






























But, since fj(u(T ;Q)) is unique for all j ∈ T , then fi(u(T ;Q)) is also unique, which finishes the
proof.
In Theorem 6 we provide a characterization of the family of LS-values, using among
others, the complete null player property (SE4c). Even if the covering value is an element of
this family, this property is not directly included in Theorem 10. Nevertheless, notice that
under symmetry, the definition of the splitting level of an embedded coalition and (SE5)
imply the complete null player property (SE4c) as you can see in the proof of Theorem 10
(Equation (18)).
6. Conclusions
Inspired by our previous work on a lattice structure of ECN , we have built the family
of LS-values which contain many of the existing generalizations of the Shapley value. As it
is a broad family, it is not easy to find a closed expression for an arbitrary member. The
computation in a particular game is also not a simple task as one first needs to write the game
29
as a combination of unanimity games. However, the family of LS-values is supported by an
appealing axiomatization that uses four properties that generalize the ones used by Shapley
(1953) in his seminal characterization. The first three properties, efficiency, symmetry, and
linearity are very standard and have been extensively used in the framework of games with
externalities. The fourth one, is the main novelty of the characterization result as it is a
new version of the null player property. There is quite a debate about how to generalize
the classic property and we contribute to it by introducing a property which is weaker than
others. Figure 2 depicts the inclusion relation among several families of values for games
with externalities, identifying some values in each family.
In the future, we would like to work on related issues like methods to ease the com-
putation of values for games with externalities. We also plan to study monotonicity or
marginality properties that LS-values might satisfy and explore alternative characterizations
of the family. Finally, there are some open questions about how to write other values of the
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Figure 2: Families of values diagram.
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